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CAMPUS SEXUAL MISCONDUCT AS SEXUAL HARASSMENT: A DEFENSE 
OF THE DOE 
Katharine K. Baker* 
INTRODUCTION 
The Department of Education’s (DOE) campaign to regulate sexual 
misconduct on college campuses has captured the attention of both 
university administrators and the popular press.
1
  Acting under the threat 
that DOE will withhold federal educational funds, universities are 
making changes to both their substantive definition of sexual misconduct 
and the procedural rules pursuant to which students who violate those 
substantive standards are disciplined.
2
  Many people, in and outside the 
academy, have criticized these changes.
3
 
                                                          
*  Professor Baker is a Distinguished Professor of Law at IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law.  Over 
the past 20 years, she has written extensively on rape reform, sexual entitlement norms, and the 
difficulties with enforcing rape law.  
 1.   Since the beginning of 2014, the New York Times has published over 300 articles  on 
sexual assault on college campuses.  N.Y. TIMES, 
http://query.nytimes.com/search/sitesearch/?action=click&contentCollection&region=TopBar&WT.
nav=searchWidget&module=SearchSubmit&pgtype=Homepage#/campus+sexual+assault/from2014
0101to20160229/ (last visited Feb. 29, 2016) (listing 311 stories about sexual assault on college 
campuses).  Many of the stories followed DOE’s release of what has come to be known as the “Dear 
Colleague Letter,” the document in which DOE outlined its plans to regulate sexual misconduct as 
sexual harassment.  See U.S. DEP’T. OF EDUC., OFFICE OF CIVIL RIGHTS, DEAR COLLEAGUE LETTER: 
SEXUAL VIOLENCE BACKGROUND, SUMMARY AND FAST FACTS (2011) [hereinafter DEAR 
COLLEAGUE LETTER], 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/fact_sheet_sexual_violence.pdf (summarizing the 
points of the Dear Colleague Letter in a separate document).  
 2.  See U.S. DEP’T. OF EDUC., U.S. Department of Education Releases List of Higher 
Education Institutions with Open Title IX Sexual Violence Investigations (May 1, 2014), 
http://www.ed.gov/news/press-releases/us-department-education-releases-list-higher-education-
institutions-open-title-ix-sexual-violence-investigations; see also CNN Staff, Colleges, Universities 
Respond to Sexual Violence Investigation, CNN (last updated May 1, 2014, 9:39 PM), 
http://www.cnn.com/2014/05/01/us/colleges-sex-complaint-reactions/ (listing colleges and 
universities responding to DOE regulations). 
 3. See, e.g., Jed Rubenfeld, Mishandling Rape, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 15, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/16/opinion/sunday/mishandling-rape.html 
(arguing sexual assault on campus should mean what it means in the criminal law); Caroline 
Kitchens, Overreaching on Campus Rape, THE NATIONAL REVIEW (May 13, 2014), 
http://www.nationalreview.com/article/377878/overreaching-campus-rape-caroline-kitchens (“If 
President Obama really wants to take rape seriously, he will take the power away from campus 
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This essay explains and defends DOE’s campaign against sexual 
misconduct on university campuses.  It does so because, despite all the 
publicity, DOE has done an inexplicably poor job of explaining the 
theory under which it is compelling universities to act.  DOE is not 
mandating that schools adopt a particular definition of rape.  Nor is it 
demanding that universities do what the criminal law has not done in 
policing rape.  DOE is demanding that universities do something 
different.  My understanding of DOE’s theory is this: 
The common expropriation of sex from people who do not want their 
bodies used sexually creates a disorienting and discouraging 
atmosphere for those who feel used.  It is an atmosphere that inhibits an 
equal sense of belonging and respect in an educational community.  It 
is sexual harassment. 
Once one understands the regulation of sexual conduct as a problem 
of discrimination—a problem outside, even if also partially inside, the 
criminal law—much of the criticism of the DOE falls away. 
Critics are fond of pointing out that universities are not well-
equipped to adjudicate criminal matters.
4
  This is true but beside the 
point because universities routinely regulate and adjudicate non-criminal 
student conduct.  Universities demand civility, honesty and norms of 
respect from their student body.  Schools regularly punish students who 
engage in unruly behavior, even if those students are not pursued 
criminally.
5
  Schools punish cheaters and those who fail to report 
cheaters.
6
  They punish students who engage in racially offensive speech 
                                                          
kangaroo courts and place such criminal investigations where they belong: in the hands of trained 
law enforcement.”). 
 4.  Rubenfeld, supra note 3; Kitchens, supra note 3.  See also Elizabeth Bartholet et al., 
Rethink Harvard’s Sexual Harassment Policy, THE BOSTON GLOBE (Oct. 15, 2014), 
https://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2014/10/14/rethink-harvard-sexual-harassment-
policy/HFDDiZN7nU2UwuUuWMnqbM/story.html (op-ed written by Harvard Law School faculty 
members criticizing Harvard’s proposed rules because they did not provide adequate criminal law 
safeguards for the accused).  
 5.  See Jake New, Expulsions After Riots, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Oct. 24, 2014), 
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2014/10/24/try-clean-image-west-virginia-u-expels-three-
students-after-riots (describing West Virginia University’s expulsion of students for burning their 
own furniture in a celebration for the football team).  The school acted independently of the police 
and justified its actions because behaving in such a raucous manner “is not how Mountaineers 
behave.”  Id.  
 6.  For examples of honor codes that require students to report others, see The Haverford 
College Honor Code, HAVERFORD COLLEGE, http://honorcouncil.haverford.edu/the-code/ (“[U]nless 
it is indisputable that an academic violation did not occur, the confronted student must report the 
situation to Honor Council.”); Drake University College of Pharmacy and Health Sciences Honor 
Code, DRAKE UNIVERSITY http://www.drake.edu/cphs/handbookspolicies/honorcode/ (“All 
members of the College community have a duty to report violations of the Honor Code.”); The 
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even though that speech has the full protection of the First Amendment 
behind it.
7
  In short, universities prohibit all sorts of conduct that cannot 
be punished criminally. 
This essay explains why policing sexual misconduct can and should 
be seen as a problem outside of the criminal law, but it also highlights 
two significant issues, one procedural and one substantive, that remain 
even once the problem is viewed as one of sex discrimination.  There are 
hard questions that need to be asked about the standards of proof that are 
appropriate and the degree of injury that should be necessary when 
schools regulate sexual harassment.  Those questions should be the focus 
of the discussion—what to do about harassment—not what to do about 
campus rape. 
Part I of this essay summarizes some of my previous work 
explaining why the criminal law is particularly ill-suited to regulate 
sexual misconduct, particularly sexual misconduct between 
acquaintances.  If sexual expropriation is to be regulated and if norms of 
male sexual entitlement are to be upended, it may be necessary to look at 
regulatory mechanisms outside of the criminal law. 
The need to look beyond the criminal law is bolstered by a variety of 
different reports from college campuses, all of which show that sexual 
expropriation is commonplace.
8
  As Part IIA shows, nonconsensual 
sex—regardless of whether one calls it “rape”—is prevalent on college 
campuses, and it disproportionately—wildly disproportionately—affects 
women and sexual minorities.
9
  The fact that women and sexual 
minorities are so much more likely than men and non-minorities to have 
sex expropriated from them helps illuminate the problem as one of sex 
discrimination.  Sexual harassment law polices unwelcome sexual 
conduct that unreasonably interferes with an individual’s educational 
experience or creates an intimidating and offensive environment.  Part 
IIB explicates sexual harassment case law to demonstrate just how well 
the regulation of college sexual misconduct fits into a sex discrimination 
paradigm. 
                                                          
Honor System, VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY, http://www.vanderbilt.edu/student_handbook/the-honor-
system/  (“Failure to report a known or suspected violation of the Code in the manner prescribed” is 
an honor code violation.). 
 7.  The most well-known recent example involved members of a University of Oklahoma 
fraternity who were taped singing a racist song, but there have been numerous other incidents as 
well.  See Jake New, Punishment, Post-Oklahoma, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Apr. 1, 2015), 
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2015/04/01/some-college-leaders-are-responding-quickly-
racist-and-sexist-incidents. 
 8.  See infra Part II.A.  
 9.  See infra Part II.A.  
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Part III evaluates how the courts that have recently reviewed 
university disciplinary processes have missed the essence of the 
discrimination claim.  Courts treat university tribunals as semi-criminal 
adjudicatory bodies, but because the regulation of sexual harassment is 
not a criminal matter, the substantive definition of unacceptable conduct 
and the process used to evaluate that conduct need not conform to 
criminal law safeguards.  No one’s liberty is at stake.  Universities are 
simply demanding that their citizens’ sexual behavior comport with what 
the university defines as basic standards of decency.  Most courts do not 
seem to understand this. 
Having cleared away the detritus created by the common but inapt 
comparisons to criminal law, Part IV turns to what I see as the two most 
difficult issues raised by DOE’s plan to regulate sexual misconduct as 
sexual harassment.  One problem is procedural, the other substantive.  
The procedural issue involves the right to confrontation and how it 
pertains to the burden of proof.  In any proceeding in which credibility is 
crucial, the accused’s need to confront a complainant is at its apex.  But 
the process of being confronted, by a stranger, in front of strangers, and 
questioned about intimate details involving one’s sexual behavior is 
incredibly difficult on victims.  Most victims of sexual misconduct do 
not want to put themselves through that ordeal.  This is one of the main 
reasons why the criminal law has failed to regulate sexual misconduct 
effectively. 
On procedural matters, like a right to confrontation, the criminal law 
has always drawn a line that overprotects the accused at the expense of a 
victim.  Discrimination law has drawn that line differently; it has 
overprotected a class that has been traditionally discriminated against at 
the expense of potentially innocent defendants.
10
  Reasonable minds may 
differ on the appropriate place to draw that line when it comes to the 
regulation of sexual misconduct on college campuses, but reasonable 
minds should agree that criminal and civil processes have drawn the line 
in different places.  Whether schools draw more of a civil than criminal 
law line with regard to who they overprotect will have a tremendous 
effect on their ability to punish sexual misconduct. 
The substantive dilemma involved with regulating sexual harassment 
on college campuses goes to the nature of the harm to the victim.  Sexual 
harassment law suggests that an atmosphere in which unwelcome sexual 
conduct is prevalent can constitute a hostile environment because women 
should not have to accept a culture in which they feel routinely used and 
                                                          
 10.  See infra text accompanying notes 83–87.  
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disrespected by their peers.
11
  When men repeatedly bully and badger 
women into non-consensual sex and when men take the sex they want 
regardless of whether a woman demonstrates consent, women feel 
offended.  But it is not altogether clear that the injury that flows from 
being bullied into sex is that much worse than the injury that flows from 
being a willing participant in a sexual encounter that did not go well.  
One can feel used and disrespected after a sexual encounter that one 
actively embraced at the outset.  The real difference between the two 
events is likely not the magnitude of the harm to the victim; it is instead 
the justification of the man’s behavior.  Is it appropriate to regulate 
boorish, entitled sexual behavior not because it does irreparable damage 
to its targets, but just because it cannot be justified in its own right?  
Those are the questions that Part IV raises, even if it does not fully 
answer. 
I. THE INADEQUACY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 
If the criminal law could regulate non-consensual sex effectively, the 
problem of repeated sexual misconduct on college campuses might never 
have surfaced.  Rape reformers in the 1970s and 80s successfully 
modified most states’ criminal law statutes in the hope that states could 
prosecute men who proceeded to have sex with women who had said or 
otherwise indicated “no.”  The impetus for much of this rape reform 
movement came from a recognition that men routinely helped 
themselves to sex that they wanted, regardless of women’s desires.  
Entrenched norms of male entitlement and female responsibility,
12
 status 
games involving sexual conquest,
13
 and cultural scripts proscribing 
verbal communication but encouraging women’s passivity
14
 all led to a 
                                                          
 11.  For an explication of what kind of environment constitutes sexual harassment, see Harris v. 
Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21–22 (1993) and infra Part II.B. 
 12.  See Lynne Henderson, Rape and Responsibility, 11 L. & PHIL. 127, 132–44 (1992) 
(exploring the ubiquitous stories of male innocence and female guilt that pervade religious, 
philosophical and scientific thought).  
 13.  For a famous example of boys using a point system to keep track of their sexual conquests, 
see Jennifer Allen & Brian Smale, Boys: Hanging with the Spur Posse, Rolling Stone (July 8—22, 
1993) (explaining the point system used by a group of teenage boys in California).  For a more 
recent example of boys keeping score of their sexual conquests at an elite New Hampshire prep 
school, see Jess Bidgood, In Girl’s Account, Rite at St. Paul’s Boarding School Turned into Rape, 
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 19, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/20/us/in-st-pauls-rape-trial-girl-
vividly-recounts-night-of-school-ritual.html?_r=0.  
 14.  For a general account of male assertiveness and female passivity, see ROBIN WARSHAW & 
ANDREA PARROT, The Contribution of Sex-Role Socialization to Acquaintance Rape, Acquaintance 
Rape: The Hidden Crime 73, 75 (Andrea Parrot & Laurie Bechhofer eds., 1991) (“From their 
socialization in childhood and adolescence, [men and women] develop[] different goals related to 
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strong likelihood that men would be minimally interested in discerning 
whether a partner actually wanted to have sex.  This willful ignorance on 
men’s part was both the norm and the problem.  It was why women were 
so routinely used sexually. 
Rape reformers succeeded in changing much of the law.  Many state 
courts and legislatures now allow fact finders to convict someone who 
has proceeded to have sex in a situation in which the question of consent 
is ambiguous, with no clear sign of no or yes.
15
  However, the norms 
surrounding sexual entitlement have not changed nearly as much.  Rape 
convictions are still rare.
16
  Police and prosecutors regularly drop cases 
and victims often choose not to go forward or even report in the first 
instance.
17
  Because so few cases get reported and prosecuted, entitled 
male behavior rarely gets punished.  Thus, the criminal law has not 
eroded the norm of male entitlement effectively; when targeted behavior 
is not punished, norms about that behavior’s legitimacy can stay stuck.
18
 
Three important impediments help explain why the criminal law 
could not do the job that rape reformers wanted it to do: the criminal 
standard of proof, competing social constructions of rapists, and the 




The vast majority of sexual encounters, whether consensual or 
coerced or forced, take place in private, with no witnesses and with no 
demonstrable evidence of what happened.  Because it is so common  for 
two people who know each other—even if they just met—to consent to a 
casual sexual encounter, it is exceedingly difficult to prove, beyond a 
reasonable doubt, that what happened was non-consensual.  The only 
evidence the prosecution usually has is the victim’s story and that is 
likely to be imperfect and impeachable. 
For many young people, particularly on college campuses, drinking 
precedes sexual activity.  Alcohol impairs victims’ ability to remember 
                                                          
sexuality . . . .  [M]en are supposed to single-mindedly go after sexual intercourse with a female, 
regardless of how they do it. . . .  [W]omen should passively acquiesce.”).  
 15.  For a discussion of different state approaches, see MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.2 cmt. at 41–
42 (Am. Law Inst., Tentative Draft No. 1, 2014) [hereinafter ALI Draft] (discussing different state 
approaches to the consent requirement).   
 16.  See generally Corey Rayburn Yung, Rape Law Fundamentals, 27 YALE J. L. & FEMINISM 
1, 42–43 (2015).   
 17.  Id.  
 18.  Dan M. Kahan, Gentle Nudges vs. Hard Shoves: Solving the Sticky Norms Problem, 67 U. 
Chi. L. Rev. 607, 607 (2000) (describing problem of “the prevalence of a social norm mak[ing] 
decisionmakers reluctant to carry out a law intended to change that norm”). 
 19.  I explore all of these impediments in more detail in Katharine K. Baker, Why Rape Should 
Not (Always) Be a Crime, 100 Minn. L. Rev. 221 (2015).   
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what happened clearly.  Even if a victim has not been drinking, her 
memory of a rape tends to be less clear than victims recounting other 
traumatic experiences.
20
  This makes sense given the subject matter.  
How good is anyone at describing their last sexual encounter, consensual 
or not, to strangers, over and over again?  Most of us simply do not have 
the vocabulary to convincingly describe the feelings, sensations and 
actions surrounding sexual encounters.
21




The accused does not have to testify.  His story, his demeanor, his 
history of truth-telling is never questioned.  Juries often believe a 
woman’s story mostly, but not enough to find her story true beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  Evidence suggests that given the different levels of 
scrutiny the parties receive, the burden of proof makes a huge difference 
in rape trials.
23
  The criminal law cannot punish what it cannot prove 




The second major impediment to criminal rape convictions stems 
from competing cultural narratives of what it means to be a rapist.  It is 
exceedingly difficult for the criminal law to punish behavior that is 
perceived as normal.
25
  Many prominent rape reformers recognized this 
quandary.  They knew juries were unlikely to hold an individual man 
                                                          
 20.  Arthur H. Garrison, Rape Trauma Syndrome: A Review of a Behavioral Science Theory 
and Its Admissibility in Criminal Trials, 23 Am. J. Trial Advocacy 591, 625 (2000) (citing studies).  
 21.  For discussions of complainants who have struggled trying to explain what happened, see 
Richard Pérez-Péna & Kate Taylor, Fight Against Sexual Assaults Holds Colleges to Account, N.Y. 
TIMES (May 3, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/04/us/fight-against-sex-crimes-holds-
colleges-to-account.html (Columbia University student described her testimony to college tribunal as 
requiring that she “tell an embarrassing story and then teach them an embarrassing subject [which 
felt] really gross.”); Walt Bogdanich, Reporting Rape, and Wishing She Hadn’t: How One College 
Handled a Sexual Assault Complaint, N.Y. TIMES (July 12, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/13/us/how-one-college-handled-a-sexual-assault-complaint.html 
(“It was one of the hardest things I have ever gone through . . . I felt like I was talking to someone 
who knew nothing of any sort of social interaction; what happens at parties; what happens in sex.”). 
 22.  Katharine K. Baker, Text, Context, and the Problem with Rape, 28 Sw. U. L. Rev. 297, 
306–07 (1999) (discussing how people’s reluctance to talk about sex makes it very difficult to assess 
the difference between rape and sex).  
 23.  See Baker, supra note 19, at 239–43 (discussing numerous cases which fell apart because 
of victim credibility, including the U.S. Army’s case against Brigadier General Jeffery A. Sinclair, 
the well-reported incident involving two Columbia University students in which the standard of 
proof was not met, a California juvenile case in which the judge admitted that if the case had been 
tried to a jury there never would have been a conviction, and cases in which jurors admitted that the 
prosecution met a civil but not a criminal standard of proof with regard to non-consent). 
 24.  This seems to be the case on college campuses.  Surveys indicated that the majority of 
women do not report incidents of nonconsensual sex, even if it was accomplished by force or severe 
incapacitation.  See discussion of studies, infra Part II.A.   
 25.  See Kahan, supra note 18, at 608.   
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criminally responsible for conforming to a status quo which the law had 
long accepted.
26
  In an effort to make convictions more palatable to 
juries, most rape statutes introduced degrees of sexual assault, allowing 
lesser penalties for those crimes that involved less physical coercion.
27
  
By acknowledging that some forms of rape were less heinous than 
others, reformers hoped the law would be able to punish more conduct. 
It is possible that the introduction of gradations of sexual assault 
could have made convictions palatable enough to upend entrenched 
norms of male sexual entitlement, but the job was made significantly 
harder by a competing, seemingly sympathetic, effort to take rape more 
seriously by punishing it more comprehensively.  A series of federal 
initiatives in the 1990s required states to develop registration and 
notification systems for sex offenders.
28
  Congress amended the Federal 
Rules of Evidence for rape trials, based on the belief that there is 
something uniquely pathological about rapists’ character.
29
  These 
“tough-on-crime” measures completely undermine an insight at the heart 
of rape reform—that rape is commonplace because it is the natural 
outgrowth of accepted norms of male sexual entitlement.  Rape 
reformers wanted to change the gendered scripts of entitlement more 
than they wanted to punish the individual men who conformed to them, 
but the tough-on-crime measures located the problem in individual men.  
                                                          
 26.  Catharine MacKinnon phrased the problem this way: “when so many rapes involve honest 
men and violated women . . . is the woman raped, but not by a rapist?”  CATHARINE A. 
MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 183 (1989); Susan Estrich observed “it is 
easier to condemn date rape than it is to punish date rapists.”  Susan Estrich, Palm Beach Stories, 11 
L. & PHIL. 5, 32–33 (1992).   
 27.  See Cassia C. Spohn, The Rape Reform Movement: The Traditional Common Law and 
Rape Law Reforms, 39 JURIMETRICS 119, 122–24 (1999) (suggesting that introducing gradations of 
sexual offenses was one of the three main pillars of rape reform in the 1970s and 80s).  For a list of 
the various different kinds of “non-violent” acts that are criminalized, see Patricia J. Falk, Not Logic, 
But Experience: Drawing on Lessons from the Real World in Thinking About the Riddle of Rape-By-
Fraud, 123 YALE L.J. ONLINE 353 (2013).  
 28.  See Baker, supra note 19, at 248–49 (describing registration and notification program).  
Registration requirements affect men who are convicted of offenses considered far worse than 
traditional rape.  The young man convicted of statutory rape at an elite prep school, even though the 
jury concluded that the victim consented, had to register as a sex offender.  See Jess Bidgood, Owen 
Labrie Gets Year in Jail for St. Paul’s School Assault, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 29, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/30/us/owen-labrie-st-pauls-school-sentencing.html?_r=0.  See also 
supra note 13, in which a young man who taped his friends engaging in sex with an exceedingly 
drunk woman had to register as a sex offender, even though the men accused of rape were not 
convicted.  See Baker, supra note 19, at 241–42; Art Barnum, Guilty Plea in Taped-Assault Case, 
CHI. TRIBUNE (Jan. 14, 2005), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2005-01-
14/news/0501140222_1_sexual-assault-boot-camp-brookfield.   
 29.  See Katharine K. Baker, Once A Rapist? Motivational Evidence and Relevancy in Rape 
Law, 110 HARV. L. REV. 563, 576–78 (1997) (citing legislative history suggesting that rapists were 
“a small class of depraved criminals”).  
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According to the tough-on-crime advocates, once we cordoned the 
pathological people off, by prosecuting them under separate rules, 
forcing them into civil commitment facilities, and permanently branding 
them, we would be safer. 
There is no evidence that rapists, particularly date rapists, are 
uniquely deviant, or psychologically impaired, or necessarily prone to 
recidivism.
30
  Many men commit rape without even knowing that they 
have done so.
31
  Men, particularly young men, continue to engage in 
status games for sex;
32
 they continue to treat sex as a good for the 
taking;
33
 they continue to pay little attention to whether their partners 
want to continue.
34
  Because so many “regular” men continue to do this, 
it is hard to see them as the rapists that the tough-on-crime measures 
were designed to control. 
The third problem with expecting the criminal law to prosecute 
nonconsensual sex effectively stems from the inevitable subordination of 
the victim’s agency in a criminal proceeding.  Most scholars and 
commentators perceive the essence of rape’s injury as an injury to sexual 
autonomy and one’s sense of self.
35
  What makes nonconsensual sex so 
                                                          
 30.  Christina E. Wells & Erin Elliott Motley, Reinforcing the Myth of the Crazed Rapist: A 
Feminist Critique of Recent Rape Legislation, 81 B.U. L. REV. 127, 158 n.135 (2001) (citing studies, 
none of which suggest a higher recidivism rate for rapists).  One study that found a high recidivism 
rate, David Lisak & Paul M. Miller, Repeat Rape and Multiple Offending Among Undetected 
Rapists, 17 VIOLENCE & VICTIMS 73 (2002), has been very widely criticized.  See Robby Soave, 
Campus Rape Expert Who Misrepresented His Work Faces Powerful New Criticism, REASON.COM 
(Aug. 11, 2015), https://reason.com/blog/2015/08/11/campus-rape-expert-who-misrepresented-hi. 
 31.  Men regularly confuse women’s fear with acquiescence.  Men interpret women’s non-
verbal behavior as consent when women do not mean them to, and men and women generally 
disagree about what might have constituted force in a sexual encounter.  For a discussion, see Baker 
supra note 19, at 230–31.  
 32.  For a description of the senior salute, see Bidgood supra note 13.  
 33.   Rashawn Ray & Jason A. Rosow, Getting Off and Getting Intimate: How Normative 
Institutional Arrangements Structure Black and White Fraternity Men’s Approaches Toward 
Women, 12 MEN & MASCULINITIES 523, 530–31 (2010) (“[Y]ou do not need to do all that wine and 
dine them and all that.  You can skip all that and just bring them back to the house and do what’s 
important to you. . . . If they [women] [are] decent or just okay, I’ll just mess around with them . . . 
Get head.”). 
 34.   See Paula England, Emily F. Shafer & Alison Fogarty, Hooking Up and Forming 
Romantic Relationships on Today’s College Campuses in The Gendered Society Reader 532, 538 
(M.S. Kimmel & A. Aronson, eds., 2008) (describing men saying “if it’s just a hook-up . . . it’s more 
of a selfish thing.”  “If it’s a one night thing, I don’t think [the woman’s experience] is going to 
matter to [men] much”); Elizabeth L. Paul & Kristen A. Hayes, The Casualties of ‘Casual’ Sex: A 
Qualitative Exploration of the Phenomenology of College Students’ Hookups, 19 J. OF SOCIAL & 
PERSONAL REL. 639, 653 (2002)  (“I got oral sex without putting much effort forth.”). 
 35.  For a full explication of rape as a violation of sexual autonomy, see Stephen J. Schulhofer, 
UNWANTED SEX: THE CULTURE OF INTIMIDATION AND THE FAILURE OF LAW 274 (1998) 
(concluding chapter entitled “Taking Sexual Autonomy Seriously”).  The Supreme Court has written 
that “[s]hort of homicide, [rape] is the ‘ultimate violation of self.’”  Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 
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injurious to one’s autonomy stems from the “social valence” of sex
36
 and 
the parts of the body that are invaded and touched.  Being non-
consensually touched on one’s elbow does not involve the same injury as 
being groped because contact with the elbow is not perceived by the 
person who touches or the person who is touched as remotely 
comparable to being touched sexually.  It is not understood as the same 
kind of affront to dignity or autonomy. 
Asking the criminal law to vindicate that injury to autonomy by 
prosecuting sexual crimes requires the victim to go through a process 
that inevitably causes more injury to her sense of her own autonomy.
37
  
First, a victim must report this touching or invasion of what is uniformly 
acknowledged to be a particularly personal and intimate part of the body 
to medical authorities, who scrutinize her story for possible health 
ramifications.
38
  Then she must tell her story to police, who scrutinize her 
story to ensure it makes sense to proceed to the next level of prosecution.  
This scrutiny is completely appropriate, but almost always traumatic.  
The police have to decide whether the case is worthy of prosecution, and 
the only way it will be worthy of prosecution is if the victim’s story is 
credible enough. 
If the case goes further, the woman moves on to the prosecutor, 
whose responsibility it is to take her narrative and re-tell it for her, in a 
way that is most conducive to conviction.  The prosecutor represents the 
state, not the victim.  And the state’s interest is in securing a conviction, 
not protecting the integrity or well-being of the victim.  If the prosecutor 
proceeds to trial, the victim is subject to even more severe—and 
perfectly appropriate—attacks on her credibility by the defense team.  
These attacks come in front of a panel of strangers, whose job it is to 
assess the victim’s story. 
                                                          
597 (1977).  Recently, Professor Jed Rubenfeld has argued that this view of rape as an injury to 
autonomy is misguided.  See Jed Rubenfeld, The Riddle of Rape-by-Deception and the Myth of 
Sexual Autonomy, 122 YALE L.J. 1372 (2013).  Rubenfeld’s view is controversial.  See Baker, supra 
note 19, at 232 n.42, 234 n.51 (citing many of the numerous critiques of Rubenfeld’s position).  
 36.  Gowri Ramachandran describes rape’s injury as necessarily tied to the “social valence” of 
sex.  Gowri Ramachandran, Delineating the Heinous: Rape, Sex, and Self-Possession, 123 YALE L.J. 
ONLINE 371, 372  (2013).  
 37.  For a more complete account of the way in which the criminal process itself undermines 
women’s agency, see Baker, supra note 19, at 251–63.  
 38.   Many people do not even like talking to their personal physician, whom they often know, 
about the details of their consensual sex lives, which can have medical implications.  Rape victims 
are required to answer questions from total strangers, about what they just did and had done to them 
sexually, at a time in which they are stressed and usually embarrassed at “what they let happen” to 
them.  See generally Baker, supra note 19, at 258 (many rape victims blame themselves for what 
they let happen to them).  
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All of this is inevitable and inevitably humiliating.  For many 
women, the problem gets even worse if media pick up the story.  When 
stories get reported in local or national press, the victim is under even 
greater scrutiny, making her feel more pressure to be perfect and less free 
to talk, walk, dress or behave as she wants, much less of her own person.  
It is hard to imagine how anyone could emerge from such a process with 
her sense of self intact.  It is not hard to see why so many women choose 
not to report or prosecute. 
Thus, despite the comprehensive efforts of rape reformers in the 
1970s and 80s, despite the success they had in changing the definition of 
rape and highlighting the prevalence of rape between acquaintances, very 
little rape gets punished.  It is too hard for prosecutors to prove, too hard 
for jurors to punish, and too hard for victims to endure the criminal 
process for redress.  Rape reformers asked the criminal law to dislodge 
the norm of male entitlement to sex, but because of the protections built 
into the criminal process, the criminal law did not succeed. 
II. SEXUAL HARASSMENT ON COLLEGE CAMPUSES 
A. Sexual Behavior on College Campuses 
The failure of the criminal law to upend the norm of male sexual 
entitlement may explain why men expropriate so much nonconsensual 
sex on college campuses.  The graph below shows the results of three 
different recent attempts to discern the extent of sexual misconduct on 
college campuses.
39
  The Campus Sexual Assault Study (CSA)
40
 was a 
web-based survey of undergraduate students attending two large public 
universities in 2005.  It had a response rate of 42% and reported that 
19.8% (one in five) women on university campuses experience some 
form of sexual misconduct or assault.
41
  This is the study relied on by the 
DOE and the White House when the DOE launched its current campaign 
against college sexual assault.
42
  The Community Attitudes on Sexual 
                                                          
 39.  All of these studies are cited and described in American Association of Universities, 
Executive Summary: Report on the AAU Campus Climate Survey on Sexual Assault and Sexual 
Misconduct, xiii–xv (2015) [hereinafter AAU Executive Summary], https://www.aau.edu/Climate-
Survey.aspx?id=16525.  
 40.  CHRISTOPHER P. KREBS ET AL., THE CAMPUS SEXUAL ASSAULT (CSA) STUDY: FINAL 
REPORT xiii (2007), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/221153.pdf. 
 41.  Id. at x.   
 42.  See Caitlin Emma, W.H. Cracks Down on Campus Sexual Assault, Politico (last updated 
Apr. 29, 2014, 1:09 PM), http://www.politico.com/story/2014/04/white-house-continues-crackdown-
on-campus-sexual-assault-106129. 
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Assault (CASA) survey was a web-based survey conducted by the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology; it had a response rate of 35% and 
found that 17% of women experience sexual misconduct on MIT’s 
campus.
43
  The Association of American Universities (AAU) survey was 
a web-based survey conducted in 2015 by a research firm engaged by 
twenty-seven colleges and universities.
44
  The response rate was 19.3% 
and it found a higher incidence of sexual misconduct, 33.1%  (one in 
three).
45
  The AAU survey is one of only a few to include several 
different kinds of educational institutions (large, small, rural, urban), but 
its results did not indicate significant differences based on kind of 
institution.
46
  It also attempted to unearth data about sexual misconduct 
in non-heterosexual populations.
47
  The incidence of sexual misconduct 
among those who identify as Trans, Gay, Queer, or Nonconforming was 




                                                          
 43.  See AAU Executive Summary, supra note 39, at xv.  
 44.  Id. at iii.   
 45.  Id. at vi, 23.  
 46.  Id. at iii. 
 47.  Id. at xiv.   
 48.  Id.  
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These studies are controversial in large part because of their low 
response rates and their inconsistency with two other studies done on the 
population as a whole.  There is no doubt that the response rates for these 
studies are low.  Most experts believe that those individuals who do not 
respond to a web-based survey are less likely to have been victimized 
than those who do respond.
49
  Accurate incidence rate figures are thus 
likely less than one in five or one in three or two in five.  Even if one 
assumes an incidence rate half as large for the population that did not 
respond, however, the reports still indicate that there is a substantial 
amount of nonconsensual sex on college campuses.  Few people would 
argue that schools or victims should be content with an incidence rate of 
10%, for instance.  University administrators seem to understand this.  
Official responses to these surveys routinely admit that even if the 
reports indicate incident rates that are artificially high, the data show a 
likely degree of sexual misconduct that is unacceptable.
50
 
The studies with which the campus surveys are sometimes 
compared, the National College Women’s Sexual Violence Survey 
(NCWSV) and the 2014 Bureau of Justice Statistics Report (BJSR), both 
had significantly higher response rates,
51
 but they both asked 
significantly more limited questions.
52
  They did not screen for acts 
involving incapacitation (due to drugs or alcohol); they did not ask 
behavioral based questions aimed to capture behavior that the victim may 
not have recognized as rape or sexual assault,
53
 and they did not even 
                                                          
 49.  Id. at vi–vii.  
 50.  See Eric Isaccs, Message About Sexual Misconduct from Provost Eric D. Isaacs (Sept. 24, 
2015), https://csl.uchicago.edu/get-involved/climate-survey-project/spring-2015-climate-survey-
materials/message-on-sexual-misconduct (describing results from the University of Chicago’s 
survey of its own population as “similar to the results of . . . peer institutions . . . [and] deeply 
troubling.”); Steven Hyman, Letter to Harvard President Drew Faust on Behalf of the Task Force on 
the Prevention of Sexual Assault (Sept. 21, 2015), 
http://sexualassaulttaskforce.harvard.edu/files/taskforce/files/hyman_letter_final_9.21.2015.pdf?m=
1442844014 (describing the results at Harvard as part of a “widespread and pervasive . . . problem 
across universities” and suggesting that Harvard “must plan and put in place interventions potent 
enough to meet the serious challenges documented by the survey”).  
 51.   BONNIE S. FISHER ET AL., THE SEXUAL VICTIMIZATION OF COLLEGE WOMEN, 4 (2000) 
[hereinafter NCWSV], https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/182369.pdf (response rate 85.6%); SOFI 
SINOZICH & LYNN LANGTON, RAPE AND SEXUAL ASSAULT VICTIMIZATION AMONG COLLEGE-AGE 
FEMALES 1995–2013, 3 (2014) [hereinafter BJSR],  
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/rsavcaf9513.pdf (response rate 74%).  
 52.   NCWSV asked about “completed, attempted, and threatened” forced penetration.  See 
NCWSV, supra note 51, at 9.  The BJSR collected data about acknowledged “crimes.”  It 
specifically described itself as a survey about crime, “while [others] are presented as surveys about 
public health.”  BJSR, supra note 51, at 2. 
 53.   Numerous studies indicate that women often do not describe what happened to them as 
rape, even if the act involved force and especially if the act involved non-physical coercion.  For a 
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attempt to capture forcible fondling, kissing, groping, or nonphysical 






If one accepts the notion that universities have the authority to 
regulate student behavior that falls short of criminal behavior, then the 
exact definition of the target conduct makes much less difference.  If one 
accepts the notion that universities can and should be concerned that a 
substantial portion of their female and sexual minority community feels 
like they have been used and disrespected sexually by their peers while 
in school, then the fight over whether what happens is “sexual assault” 
becomes irrelevant.  It does not matter whether what victims experienced 
is criminal.  It matters that so many students feel demeaned and insulted 




B. Sexual Harassment Law 
DOE is suggesting that universities must regulate nonconsensual sex 
on the theory that being cajoled, conned and bullied—even if not forced 
or threatened—into having sex that one does not want lessens one’s 
educational experience.  Title IX affords a woman the same protection in 
school that Title VII affords her in the workplace.
57
  The Supreme Court 
has made clear that schools can be liable for peer-on-peer sexual 
harassment if they are “deliberate[ly] indifferen[t] to known acts of 
harassment.”
58
  DOE’s “Dear Colleague”
59
 letter encourages schools not 
to remain ignorant of behavior, the existence of which might constitute a 
hostile environment.
60
  It requires schools to develop adequate 
                                                          
review of the studies, see Baker, supra note 19, at 255–56. 
 54.  NCWSV, supra note 51, at 10.  
 55.  BJSR, supra note 51, at 4.   
 56.  See Harris v. Forklift Sys., 510 U.S. 17, 22 (1993) (defines a harassing environment as an 
“environment [that] would reasonably be perceived, and is perceived, as hostile or abusive”).  
 57.   Franklin v. Gwinnett Cnty. Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 75 (1992); Patricia H. v. Berkeley 
Unified Sch. Dist., 830 F. Supp. 1288, 1290 (N.D. Cal. 1993).  Sexual harassment law also protects 
against same-sex harassment.  See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 82 
(1998) (finding sexual harassment when a group of men harassed another man).  
 58.  Davis v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 633 (1999). 
 59.  The “Dear Colleague” letter is the letter in which DOE articulated many of the standards it 
was going to use to determine if schools were protecting women from harassing conduct.  See DEAR 
COLLEAGUE LETTER, supra note 1.   
 60.  Some commentators have criticized the Davis standard for encouraging schools to stay 
ignorant of students’ behavior.  See Deborah L. Rhode, Sex in Schools: Who’s Minding the Adults?, 
in DIRECTIONS IN SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW 290, 298 (Catharine A. MacKinnon & Reva B. Siegel 
eds., 2004). 
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The EEOC sexual harassment guidelines, drafted for use in 
employment cases, but applicable to educational settings as well, define 
harassment as “conduct [that] has the purpose or effect of unreasonably 
interfering with an individual’s work performance or creating an 
intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment.”
62
  Being 
badgered into sex that one does not want can unreasonably interfere with 
an individual’s school performance.  Women who have been bullied into 
sex may be reasonably offended at the prospect of having to go to class, 
or debate practice, or sit at lunch with men who took advantage of them 
at a party, or did not respect them enough to ask if they wanted to keep 
going, or just hovered over them, pawing, pursuing their own sexual 
desires without any regard for the women’s disinterest or discontent.  All 
of that kind of behavior can create an intimidating and offensive 
environment, one that it is not conducive to learning or advancement. 
Whether behavior is offensive enough to constitute sexual 
harassment is a question that has been developed much more in the 
workplace context than the educational context, but generally, 
discrimination law “comes into play before the harassing conduct leads 
to a nervous breakdown.”
63
  While conduct that is “merely offensive” is 
not actionable as harassment, neither need a plaintiff demonstrate 
“tangible psychological injury.”
64
  The question of whether sexual 
conduct is offensive is not even a question of whether it is consensual; it 
is a question of whether it is “unwelcome.”
65
 
To be actionable, the conduct must be either “severe” or 
“pervasive.”
66
  Any act that constitutes criminal rape would presumably 
be considered severe enough to constitute sexual harassment even if it 
was an isolated incident.  An act that stops short of criminal rape, even if 
“boorish and offensive,” may not itself be sufficient to qualify as sexual 
harassment, but repeated pervasive, boorish and offensive behavior may 
                                                          
 61.  DEAR COLLEAGUE LETTER, supra note 1, at 2. 
 62.  29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)(3) (2015). 
 63.  Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 22 (1993). 
 64.  Id. at 21.   
 65.  Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 68 (1986).  In announcing the “welcomeness” 
standard, the Supreme Court was judging sexual conduct initiated by a superior in the workplace.  
Id. at 59.  It is not clear that in an educational setting, between peers, that it would be appropriate to 
use a welcome standard instead of a consent standard.  Nonetheless, it is worth noting that sexual 
harassment law has always used a standard other than the criminal law’s consent standard to 
evaluate whether sexual conduct is acceptable.  
 66.  Id. at 67. 
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create a hostile environment.
67
  Presumably, if a group of people 
continually conducted themselves in a boorish and offensive manner, 
even if with a series of different women, such that the boorish behavior 
pervaded the work or educational atmosphere, the targets of the offensive 
behavior would have a cause of action under Title IX. 
If one in three, or one in five, or one in ten women on college 
campuses today experience nonconsensual sexual contact because men 
do not bother to figure out or do not care whether the woman with whom 
they are having sex is consenting, it is likely that there is a pervasive 
atmosphere that “detracts” from many women’s educational 
performance, “discourages” women from participating in activities, and 
“keeps them” from advancing in ways that they otherwise would.
68
  DOE 
is using its funding power to address that problem.  To put this somewhat 
differently, DOE is trying to overcome the collective action problem that 
prevents many women who feel abused and disrespected, some badly 
and some not so badly, from bonding together to bring a hostile 
environment sexual harassment claim.  What schools do at DOE’s 
insistence, they will avoid having to do later, if, as the evidence suggests 
they could, women were to bring a claim showing that that schools’ 
failure to police aggressive sexual behavior detracts and discourages 
women from getting the educational experience to which they are 
entitled. 
III. JUDICIAL REVIEW 
Courts reviewing school disciplinary proceedings often fail to 
understand the substantive and procedural implications of treating the 
problem of sexual assault as one of sex discrimination, not criminal 
sexual assault.  In Doe v. Washington and Lee University,
69
 the federal 
district court for the Western District of Virginia found that Washington 
and Lee University had itself violated Title IX by conducting a hearing 
                                                          
 67.  Jones v. Clinton, 990 F. Supp. 657, 675 (E.D. Ark. 1998).  Paula Jones alleged that then 
Governor Bill Clinton invited her to his room, stroked her leg, exposed himself and asked if she 
wanted to perform oral sex.  Id. at 664.  Jones offered no evidence of any adverse job consequences 
and very weak evidence of any emotional injury.  Id. at 674.  The court found the one incident of 
touching boorish but the offending behavior was not in and of itself severe enough and there was no 
evidence it was frequent enough to constitute a hostile environment.  Id. at 675. 
 68.  Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 22 (1993) (“A discriminatorily abusive work 
environment, even one that does not seriously affect employees’ psychological well-being, can and 
often will detract from employees’ job performance, discourage employees from remaining on the 
job, or keep them from advancing in their careers.”).  
 69.  Doe v. Wash. and Lee Univ., No. 6:14-CV-00052, 2015 WL 4647996 (W.D. Va. Aug. 5, 
2015). 
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that showed signs of gender bias.  The bias was evident, according to the 
Court, in an article that a member of the tribunal had previously 
circulated entitled Is it Possible That There is Something In Between 
Consensual Sex and Rape . . . And That It Happens to Almost Every Girl 
Out There?
70
  The accused man contended that this article “posits that 
sexual assault occurs whenever a woman has consensual sex with a man 
and regrets it because she had internal reservations that she did not 
outwardly express.”
71
  This is not what the article suggests.  Indeed, what 
the article suggests is problematic is exactly what a sexual harassment 
theory of campus sexual assault suggests is problematic.  It is worth 
quoting from the article more completely: 
But no one talks about it.  Talking about it makes it a big deal.  It 
makes us feel like we’re whining.  It makes us feel like we’re being 
dramatic.  And we don’t want it to be dramatic.  We don’t feel entirely 
violated.  It doesn’t affect us forever.  We just feel like we got the short 
end of the stick, and that sometimes, we have to do something we don’t 
want to do, out of politeness or social obligation.  So why bring it up?  
Why risk wrongfully tagging a guy with a serious, heavy label he 
doesn’t deserve?  And more importantly, why risk being wrongfully 
tagged as “the girl who cried rape,” when we’re not trying to say it was 
rape at all?  We’re saying we don’t know what it was.  We just didn’t 
like it.  But by refusing to acknowledge the existence of these rape-ish 
situations, we’re continuing to subject ourselves to them indefinitely.
72
 
DOE is not saying that what routinely happens on college campuses 
is rape; it is saying that what routinely happens on college campuses is 
something many women are hurt by, that makes them feel violated if not 
“entirely violated.”  Many women, because they are women, feel 
pressured to give men the sex those men feel entitled to.  Unless that 
issue is addressed more comprehensively, women are likely to have to 
continue suffering the consequences. 
That a federal district court thought that this pamphlet itself was 
indication of gender bias says something rather disturbing about the 
court’s views of gender neutrality.  Does gender neutrality require 
accepting a status quo of male entitlement to sex?  Does it mean 
presuming that women are only discriminated against if they feel 
“entirely violated?”  Does it mean assuming that women should just 
                                                          
 70.  Id. at *10. 
 71.  Id. 
 72.  Veronica Ruckh, Is It Possible That There Is Something In Between Consensual Sex and 
Rape. . .And That It Happens To Almost Every Girl Out There?, TOTAL SORORITY MOVE, 
http://totalsororitymove.com/is-it-possible-that-there-is-something-in-between-consensual-sex-and-
rape-and-that-it-happens-to-almost-every-girl-out-there/ (last visited Feb. 21, 2015).  
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accept that they will get “the short end of the stick?”
73
 
As with many of these cases, it is not clear that the defendant in Doe 
should have been found responsible.  Based on the evidence presented, a 
finder of fact might well have been convinced that the complainant did 
indicate sufficient willingness to keep going.  The real problem in this 
case is that the credibility finding was so crucial and so close.  That is 
going to be a recurring and significant problem, but it is not a problem of 
gender bias.  Nor is it a violation of Title IX to allow tribunals to find for 
the complainant in close cases.  The disciplined will far more likely be 
men than women, but that is because women are far more likely to feel 
violated.  Indeed, the fact women are so much more likely to be hurt 
indicates that schools must act or they will be discriminating against 
women; “Title IX, like other anti-discrimination schemes, permits an 
inference that a significant gender-based statistical disparity may indicate 
the existence of discrimination.”
74
 
The more common problem for courts reviewing university tribunals 
in this context goes to courts’ misplaced assumption that the accused is 
entitled to criminal law safeguards.  In Doe v. Regents of University of 
California San Diego (UCSD),
75
 the Superior Court of California 
overturned UCSD’s finding of liability against a man in part because the 
university tribunal did not warn fact finders that they were not allowed to 
draw negative inferences from the accused’s refusal to testify.
76
  The 
accused in this case testified that he did not penetrate the complainant 
digitally and then invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination.
77
  The Superior Court’s citation to a criminal case
78
 in 
support of its conclusion that UCSD should have instructed the fact 
finders not to draw negative inferences from the accused’s invocation of 
the Fifth Amendment suggests that it did not understand the civil nature 
of the proceedings.  As a matter of established civil procedure, fact 
finders in civil proceedings are allowed to draw negative inferences from 
                                                          
 73.  Acting as an employer, a University would be well within its right passing a rule that 
forbade professors from asking their assistants to fetch them coffee.  This prohibition would not be 
necessary because fetching coffee is so injurious to assistants, but because the act of asking 
perpetuates an anachronistic notion of a subservient female role that is inconsistent with gender 
equality.  Why can’t a school demand that its students abandon anachronistic assumptions about 
women’s subservience and the female role in sexual encounters?  
 74.  Cohen v. Brown Univ., 101 F.3d 155, 170–71 (1st Cir. 1996). 
 75.  Doe v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. San Diego, No. 37-2015-00010549-CU-WM-CTL, 
2015 WL 4394597 (Cal. Super. Ct. July 10, 2015). 
 76.  Id. at *3. 
 77.  Id.  The tribunal’s finding of liability stated that it “would have liked to hear more 
information from [the accused].”  Id. 
 78.  The Court cited to People v. Doolin, 198 P.3d 11 (Cal. 2009), a criminal case.  
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a witness’ refusal to testify.
79
  The Superior Court’s finding in this regard 
is just wrong. 
In fairness to the court, what to do when an accused refuses to testify 
is likely to be an important and persistent issue, but judges are not 
looking in the right places for answers or analysis.  In the vast majority 
of these cases, a complainant is going to allege that the accused 
proceeded to have sex without her giving adequate indication of consent.  
To combat that narrative, the accused is going to have to produce 
evidence that there was sufficient evidence of consent.  Even then, as 
discussed above, fact finders have the difficult task of finding facts based 
on nothing other than the relative credibility of two competing stories.  If 
the accused testifies only to distinct exculpatory facts and then nothing 
else, then the bulk of the defendant’s case will not be telling a story of 
consent, it will be destroying the victim’s story of non-consent.  This is 
usually what happens in criminal rape trials and it is precisely why those 
trials are so arduous on victims.  She is likely to have had too much to 
drink, to not remember clearly, to have difficulty finding the words to 
describe what happened, to tell slightly inconsistent stories.  She is likely 
to be a bad witness.  So is he, but if he does not have to testify, fact 
finders are left only to assess her.  This dynamic highlights why it is 
important to find civil law alternatives to criminal rape trials. 
A comparable problem arose in Mock v. University of Tennessee at 
Chattanooga (UTC).
80
  Again, this is a hard and likely stereotypical case.  
Both parties had been drinking, but not necessarily enough to be 
considered legally incapacitated (and therefore incapable of consent).  
The complainant willingly entered a bedroom—from a bathroom, where 
the accused had found her on the floor.
81
  She remembered removing her 
bra but claimed to remember very little else from the evening.  
Subsequent text messages suggest that neither party remembered very 
much.
82
  The day after the incident they exchanged these messages: 
Him: “Well I don’t remember much from last night. Did you throw up 
in bed?  If you did it’s totally cool.” 
                                                          
 79.  See Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 318 (1976) (stating that “the Fifth Amendment 
does not forbid adverse inferences against parties to civil actions when they refuse to testify in 
response to probative evidence offered against them”).   
 80.  Memorandum and Order, Mock v. Univ. of Tenn. at Chattanooga, No. 14-1687-II (Tenn. 
Ch. Ct. Aug. 10, 2015) [hereinafter Mock] (order reinstating the first Initial Order of the 
administrative law judge). 
 81.  Id. at 4–5. 
 82.  Id. at 5. 
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Her: “I have no clue. I remember next to nothing about last night.” 
“Did we sleep together?”  “I definitely woke up with no clothes on.” 
Him: “I mean I assume we slept together because we woke up together 
and we were both naked.”
83
 
At the hearing, the complainant testified that she remembered the 
accused trying to sit her up in the bathroom; she also recalled lying on a 
bed, feeling pain, screaming out and having the accused try to cover her 
mouth.
84
  The accused testified that he remembered the complainant on 
the floor of the bathroom; he remembered her walking by herself into the 
bedroom, him removing her pants and performing oral sex on her, her 
removing her bra and her repositioning him as he penetrated her.
85
  He 
denied trying to cover her mouth.
86
 
In front of an Administrative Law Judge, the UTC first argued that 
the complainant was too incapacitated to consent and that the defendant 
should have realized that.  The ALJ found that the complainant was not 
too intoxicated to consent.
87
  On a petition for reconsideration, the 
university changed its claim and argued instead that a preponderance of 
the evidence indicated that the complainant had not consented.
88
  On 
reconsideration, the ALJ found for the UTC under its second theory of 
                                                          
 83.  Id. 
 84.  Id. 
 85.  Id. at 4–5, 18. 
 86.  Id. at 18. 
 87.  Contrary to what the reviewing court indicated, the ALJ’s findings were very murky with 
regard to the extent of the complainant’s incapacity, despite the fact that the University asked the 
ALJ to clarify this critical issue.  Id. at 15.  The ALJ found that the UTC did not meet its burden of 
showing that the complainant was intoxicated to the point of being incapable of consenting to sexual 
activity.  Id.  The ALJ also wrote that the complainant “did not convince [me] that she was 
intoxicated.”  Id. at 15 n.3.  It is very hard to believe that the ALJ did not believe the complainant 
was at all impaired by the alcohol she drank.  The accused testified that he thought the complainant 
was “tipsy.”  Id. at 4.  Both parties’ text messages acknowledge that they did not remember very 
much from the night before.  The texts were not disputed and clearly suggest that they had been 
drinking enough to be impaired.  If she was not impaired by the alcohol she drank—as the reviewing 
court seemed to assume—then why was she on the floor in the bathroom, and more curiously, why 
did the accused follow her into the bathroom?  If she was not visibly inebriated or ill, wouldn’t it be 
odd for a man to follow a woman into the bathroom?  The ALJ found that the complainant exercised 
poor judgment by engaging in underage drinking.  Id. at 17–18.  Why would her judgment have been 
poor if she did not drink enough to impair her ability to act?  Recognizing that the complainant was 
somewhat incapacitated—even if not incapacitated enough to render her incapable of consent—is 
crucial because it suggests that her actions should be viewed in light of her drunkenness.  The act of 
voluntarily lying down on a bed has a different meaning when one feels sick, as does the “act” of 
letting someone else partially undress you.  If she felt awful, as many people do after drinking too 
much too quickly, she may well have just been letting a relative stranger try to make her feel better.  
This is not necessarily consenting to sex.   
 88.  Id. at 14–15. 
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liability, insufficient indication of consent.
89
 
In overturning the ALJ’s decision, the Tennessee court focused on 
the burden of proof.  The UTC’s position was that it “satisfie[d] its 
burden of proof by requiring the accused to affirmatively prove 
consent.”
90
  Without citing to any case, the court found this to be an 
“untenable” denial of due process because it was unfair to make the 
accused bear the burden of overcoming “the presumption inherent in the 
[complainant’s] charge.”
91
  As a matter of criminal law, the court would 
probably have been correct.  In a criminal case, the prosecution 
maintains the responsibility to prove beyond a reasonable doubt all 
necessary elements of a crime. 
92
  Non-consent is a necessary element of 
this “crime” because in the absence of non-consent, the act is not 
criminal. 
Analyzing these facts within a discrimination law paradigm may 
render a different result.  As a matter of discrimination law, there is a 
well-established burden-shifting protocol that requires a defendant to 
produce evidence that refutes the presumption inherent in the plaintiff’s 
prima facie case.  The court in Mock did not mention the McDonnell-
Douglas/Burdine/Hicks trilogy.
93
  Under that trilogy, the burden shifts to 
a defendant to offer a non-discriminatory reason for adverse employment 
action once the plaintiff introduces evidence of a prima facie case.
94
  
What that would mean in this context is that given “the presumption [of 
nonconsent] inherent in the charge,”
95
 it is appropriate for the defendant 
                                                          
 89.  See id. at 15. 
 90.  Id. at 11. 
 91.  Id. at 11–12. 
 92.  See WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, CRIMINAL LAW 54 (2d ed. 1986) (legislature 
would not be free to take non-consent, and make it an affirmative defense which the defendant must 
prove by a preponderance of the evidence unless that which the prosecution has to prove before the 
burden is switched to the defendant could itself be a criminal offense); ALI Draft, supra note 15, § 
213.4 at 70 (“[A] prosecutor’s burden is to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that no affirmative 
words or conduct by the complainant constituted, in light of the totality of the circumstances, 
positive agreement to engage in the specific conduct at issue”). 
 93.  McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973) (once plaintiff establishes a 
prima facie case of discrimination—by showing that he was a member of a protected class (under 
Title VII) and was rejected for a position for which he was qualified—the burden shifts to the 
employer to offer non-discriminatory reasons for the rejection.); Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. 
Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254–56 (1981) (plaintiff maintains the burden of persuasion once the 
defendant has met the burden to produce evidence of non-discriminatory motive); St. Mary’s Honor 
Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 514 (1993) (plaintiff must convince jury that reason for adverse action 
was discrimination, not just that defendant’s proffered reason for action was pretext).   
 94.  It is permissible to shift the burden of production to defendant, though the plaintiff always 
retains the burden of persuasion.  See generally Steven L. Wilborn et al., EMPLOYMENT LAW: CASES 
AND MATERIALS, 395–400 (5th ed. 2012). 
 95.  Mock, supra note 80 at 12. 
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to then have to offer evidence of consent to rebut that presumption.  The 
school should retain the ultimate burden of proving, by a preponderance 
of the evidence, that the sexual contact was non-consensual. 
If that is the appropriate paradigm, it appears that both the UTC and 
the court got it wrong.  UTC could not shift the burden of persuasion to 
the defendant to prove consent, but it could shift the burden of 
production to him to show consent.  His evidence of consent in this case 
was exceedingly weak.  The evidence showed  that the complainant 
removed her own bra and the accused, but not the complainant, testified 
that she re-positioned him as he penetrated her.  This could be sufficient 
to prove consent, but a fact finder could also very easily conclude that 
her behavior was not sufficient for a reasonable person to conclude that 
she was consenting.  After all, the accused found the complainant on the 
floor of the bathroom, knew she was nauseous,
96
 and knew that she had 
not said anything to indicate that she wanted to keep going.  She testified 
that she cried out in pain.  He did not remember that. 
If, under UTC’s code, it was her responsibility to make her “no” 
obvious, then the accused should not have been found responsible.  If it 
was his responsibility to make sure she was consenting, he should have 
been found responsible.  The UTC’s code, like many school codes, does 
not allocate responsibility so clearly.  Under the UTC code, it is 
permissible to go forward if there is clear non-verbal indication of 
consent.
97
  She does not have to say no for him to be found liable, nor 
does he have to make sure that she is saying yes.  On this evidence, a fact 
finder could go either way. 
In reversing instead of remanding, the Tennessee court seemed 
astonished that all the defendant would have needed to do to meet his 
burden was testify that the complainant had said “Yes.”
98
  The Court 
suggested that this realization showed the weakness of the school’s case.  
Because she testified that she could not remember what happened, she 
would not have been able to rebut his statement of affirmative assent.  
Instead of showing how weak the UTC’s case was, though, this 
observation shows why an affirmative consent policy may make sense.  
All a defendant has to do to fully protect himself and garner exculpatory 
evidence against a subsequent charge of sexual misconduct is ask the 
                                                          
 96.  He testified that he thought she had been throwing up and in his text the next day he asked 
her if she threw up in the bed.  He clearly knew that she was either drunk or ill.  Id. at 4–5. 
 97.  UTC Rule § 1702-02-05-04(7) allows consent to be established through “acts that are 
unmistakable in their meaning.”  Id. at 20. 
 98.  “If Mr. Mock had testified that Ms. Morris said ‘Yes,’ according to her recollection, she 
was not in a condition to rebut that statement.”  Id.  
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woman he is about to have sex with whether she wants to do it, and be 
sufficiently sober to remember that he did so.  Admittedly, many people 
do not communicate so explicitly when having sex, but part of DOE’s 
goal may be to change that behavior so that sexual partners demonstrate 
more concern for each other’s well-being. 
IV. THE REAL ISSUES 
A. Procedural Safeguards? 
All three of the cases just examined are typical and hard.  Parties are 
often too drunk to remember clearly, but not drunk enough to be 
incapable of consent.  Non-verbal communication is notoriously 
inaccurate.
99
  Women often engage in some sexual contact without 
wanting, or indicating that they want, to go further.  In none of the cases 
just discussed could a reasonable juror find beyond a reasonable doubt 
that these men proceeded to have sex without signs of consent.  But a 
reasonable juror could readily find as much by a preponderance of the 
evidence. 
That is the fundamental problem in these cases.  Many people find it 
disconcerting to punish a man for something they think, but are not sure, 
that he did.  When an accused is restricted in his ability to poke holes in 
the complainant’s story or impugn her overall credibility there is less 
reason for the fact finder to dismiss her story as inaccurate.  When she is 
not confronted repeatedly, in person, it is easier to believe she is telling a 
more likely version of the truth than he is.  Criminal law safeguards do 
not make it easier to determine the truth, they just make fact finders more 
comfortable dismissing a complainant’s story as not necessarily true.  In 
an effort to encourage complainants to come forward, college tribunals 
have made it harder to dismiss complainants’ stories.  In doing so, they 
inevitably increase the risk of false positive findings of liability. 
In Doe v. UCSD, the college tribunal used alternatives to the 
traditional right of confrontation, including having the victim testify out 
of sight of the accused and having the accused submit questions to a 
hearing officer who screened some of them out and then presented them 
to the complainant.  The court found the procedures insufficiently 
protective of the accused’s rights.
100
  If the court had understood that it 
                                                          
 99.   See Baker, supra note 19 at 303–07 (women’s non-verbal acts are often interpreted by men 
as indicating a sexual desire when they are not intended that way).   
 100.  See Doe v. Regents of Univ. of Cal. San Diego, No. 37-2015-00010549-CU-WM-CTL, 
2015 WL 4394597 at *2–3 (Super. Ct. Cal. July 10, 2015).  
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was reviewing a civil rather than criminal process, it might have been 
more accepting of these procedures, but there is little doubt that adoption 
of these less confrontational methods makes it harder for an accused to 
impugn the complainant’s story. 
There are other ways to afford the accused adequate protection and 
still restrict his right to confront the alleged victim.  For instance, schools 
could create a sliding scale of penalty, with more moderate penalties 
assessed for cases in which the fact finders believe the evidence is 
especially close.  Would people be so uncomfortable finding an accused 
responsible for nonconsensual sex if the penalty for being found so 
responsible was having to switch dorms or enroll in a different class or 
not participate in the Debate Club? 
The men in all of the court cases described above were expelled 
initially.  If they had not been expelled—if they had been forced to 
switch dorms or classes because their behavior had been found to be 
inconsistent with the norms of civility and respect that the school 
required—would the courts have found it as necessary to overturn the 
schools’ decisions?  Switching dorms and re-arranging class schedules is 
not costless for the person forced to switch or for the university.  It is 
costly enough for the person being moved that he is likely entitled to 
some process from the university.  But there is no reason to think that he 
is entitled to full criminal safeguards just because the school found his 
behavior offensive enough to justify switching dorms.
101
  A sliding scale 
based on the persuasiveness of the evidence would produce more false 
positives than the criminal system—some men will be unjustly 
punished—but false positives will matter less because the ramifications 
are not as great. 
As every school child knows, criminal law safeguards embody a 
belief that it is better for many guilty people to go free than one innocent 
person to be punished.  False positives are supposed to be an anathema in 
criminal law.  Discrimination law has taken a different approach.  In an 
                                                          
 101.  In doing so, a university would be treating him much more leniently than it treats students 
whom they have found to violate school codes with regard to racial tolerance.  See the University of 
Oklahoma incident discussed in supra note 7.  See also Jake New, Punishment, Post–Oklahoma: 
College Leaders Have Gotten Speedier and More Severe in Taking Action Against Students Linked 
to Racist Incidents. Critics Fear Due Process is Being Eroded., INSIDE HIGHER ED (Apr. 1, 2015), 
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2015/04/01/some-college-leaders-are-responding-quickly-
racist-and-sexist-incidents (reporting that Bucknell University took less than a week to expel 
students who used racist speech on the college radio station); Lee Baines, University of South 
Carolina Suspends Student After Racial Whiteboard Slurs Appear Online, MODVIVE.COM (Apr. 5, 
2015), http://www.modvive.com/2015/04/05/university-of-south-carolina-suspends-student-after-
racial-whiteboard-slurs-appear-online/ (reporting that the University of  South Carolina suspended a 
student who wrote the word “nigger” on a white board).   
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effort to bring more discrimination cases to the fore, to make employers 
and schools responsible for discrimination perpetrated within 
environments that they control, Title VII and Title IX allow juries to 
draw inferences of discrimination without any direct evidence of 
discrimination.  Discrimination law allows close cases to be decided in 
favor of plaintiffs.
102
  It acknowledges the inevitability of false positives. 
The critical question for policy makers and college tribunals is 
whether it is appropriate to accept a real risk of false positives.  The 
acceptability of that risk becomes more palatable if the punishment 
imposed is relatively slight, but the risk remains. 
B. Substantive Harm? 
In Part II.B of this essay I offered what I take to be DOE’s theory—
that sexual harassment manifests itself in the common expropriation of 
sex from people who do not want their bodies used so routinely by others 
for others’ sexual pleasure.  I suggested that the pervasive expropriation 
of sex creates a demeaning and disorienting atmosphere for people who 
are regularly used in this way.  This atmosphere can “detract” and 
“discourage” women from proceeding in ways they otherwise would.
103
  
But maybe it doesn’t. 
By women’s own admission, they “let” men take sex—without 
saying no or yes—in part just to get it over with, to not make a scene.
104
  
They blame themselves for not saying no.
105
  They feel violated but not 
“entirely violated.”
106
  They do not think it will affect them forever.
107
  
According to the AAU study, the main reason victims did not report 
incidents of sexual misconduct was they did not believe the behavior was 
serious enough.
108
  Over half of the victims of forced penetration—
                                                          
 102.  See supra note 93 and accompanying text (discussion of burden-shifting approach).  
 103.  See supra Part II.B.   
 104.  See Ruckh, supra note 72; Baker, supra note 19 at 256–59 (discussing women’s desire to 
see themselves as exercising agency, even if they repeatedly fail to do so).  
 105.  See Arnold S. Kahn et al., Calling it Rape: Differences in Experiences of Women Who Do 
or Do Not Label Their Sexual Assault as Rape, 27 Psychol. of Women Q. 233, 240 (2003) 
(“[w]omen . . . attribute[] their undesired sex not to the man’s pressure or force but to their own lack 
of ability to think clearly or resist . . . . These women seem to have presumed that men are going to 
have sex with a woman unless the woman forcefully resists, and her inability to resist meant . . . that 
what happened was not rape.”); Laina Y. Bay-Cheng & Rebecca Eliseo-Arras, The Making of 
Unwanted Sex: Gendered and Neoliberal Norms on College Women’s Unwanted Sexual 
Experiences, 45 J. OF SEX RES. 386, 388 (2008) (ideals of “self-determination and personal 
responsibility . . . lead[] women to blame themselves for” unwanted sex). 
 106.  See Ruckh, supra note 72.   
 107.  Id. 
 108.  AAU Executive Summary, supra note 39 at xxi (“When asked why the incident was not 
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criminal rape—felt that the incident was not serious enough.
109
 
Much of the original motivation for rape reform stemmed from the 
feminist claim that rape was like “death;”
110
  it was “spiritual murder.”
111
  
The Supreme Court has intoned that “[s]hort of homicide, [rape] is the 
‘ultimate violation of self.’”
112
  Much of what happens on college 
campuses does not appear to be that, at least for many women.  It is 
unpleasant and it hurts.  It is demeaning.  It makes people feel used.  But 
fully consensual sex can leave one with the same feelings.  Why make 
men responsible for women’s failure to act when her failure to act often 
results in a harm no more severe than a bad, consensual sexual 
experience? 
There are two answers to that question, and reasonable minds may 
differ on whether they are sufficient to justify the regulation of sexual 
entitlement.  The first is that even if being bullied into sex only hurts 
women a little, it hurts women much, much more regularly than men.  
The indignity suffered by women is not grave, but it is commonplace and 
deeply gendered.  As a matter of discrimination law, schools should try 
to eradicate a practice that forces women and sexual minorities, but only 
very rarely heterosexual men, to suffer these indignities at the hands of 
their peers. 
The second reason why schools may be justified in regulating 
nonconsensual sex is that there is no reason to accept the status quo of 
male entitlement.  What is gained by allowing men to proceed in the face 
of ambiguous consent?  Sexual freedom?  Perhaps.  Queer theorists and 
sex positivists suggest that any restriction of sexual liberty should be 
suspect because freedom of sexual expression is so important.
113
  Critics 
of rape reform suggest that the potential harms from nonconsensual sex 
                                                          
reported, the dominant reason was it was not considered serious enough.”).   
 109.  Id.  
 110.  See Lynne N. Henderson, What Makes Rape a Crime, 3 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L. J. 193, 
227 (1987) (rape involves the “phenomenological harm of thinking you are experiencing your own 
death”).   
 111.  Robin L. West, Legitimating the Illegitimate: A Comment on Beyond Rape, 93 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1442, 1448 (1993) (rape is “spiritual murder”).  
 112.  Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597 (1977) (quoting LISA BRODYAGA, ET AL., RAPE AND 
ITS VICTIMS: A REPORT FOR CITIZENS, HEALTH FACILITIES, AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE AGENCIES 1 
(Wash. Dept. of Justice et al., 1975).  
 113.  As Robin West writes, “the queer theoretic critique, like the [radical] feminist, also 
obscures the distinction between consensual and nonconsensual sex . . . . The difference between 
radical feminism and queer theory is that queer theorists do this not toward the end of asserting the 
wrongness . . . of oppressively sexualized power . . . but rather toward asserting and then valorizing 
the ubiquitous transgressiveness of sexualized power.”  Robin West, Sex, Law, and Consent in THE 
ETHICS OF CONSENT: THEORY AND PRACTICE 221, 231–32 (F.G. Miller & A. Wertheimer eds. 
2009). 
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are the necessary flip side of the excitement and danger that draw us to 
sex in the first place.
114
  For some theorists, making sex safe is robbing 
sex of most of its transformative potential.  If sexual liberty is a (mostly) 
unqualified good and if sexual regulation is a (mostly) unqualified bad, 
then regulating campus sexual misconduct as sexual harassment is bad 
policy because it facilitates more regulation of sexual behavior. 
One’s views on the dangers of sexual regulation probably hinge on 
one’s views on the benefits of sexual freedom in general, and on college 
campuses, in particular.  Studies suggest that a great deal of what college 
students participate in is rushed, anonymous, not particularly pleasant, 
and alienating sex.
115
  As such, it usually fails to afford its participants 
the benefits that sex positivists celebrate in sex.  Both men and women 
report alarmingly high rates of unwanted, even if consensual, sex.
116
  If 
men are taking sex that they do not even care that much about simply 
because they think that is what they are supposed to do, or they are being 
pressured to take it by their male peers, or they just assume (often 
wrongly) that their evening will feel incrementally more complete if they 
have an orgasm, then what will be deterred by curtailing men’s sense of 
sexual entitlement is probably not worth saving. 
Restricting freedom of sexual expression, like curtailing freedom of 
political and racial expression, may be an important part of cultivating a 
respectful educational community.  As suggested above, universities 
routinely regulate racist speech without demanding any proof that it was 
offensive to those who heard it.  Indeed, universities expel students who 
engage in racist speech without any investigation into the harms it might 
cause.
117
  Racist speech is assumed to be damaging to the community, 
notwithstanding a constitutional principle that protects its right to be 
proclaimed.  Much of what is happening sexually on college campuses 
                                                          
 114.  “[D]esire [necessarily] risks bumping up against danger.  Feminist legal theory often 
dismisses this . . . . But to evacuate women’s sexuality of any risk of a confrontation with shame, 
loss of control, or objectification strikes me as selling women a sanitized, meager simulacrum of sex 
not worth getting riled up about . . . . It is precisely the proximity to danger, the lure of prohibition, 
the seamy side of shame that creates the heat that draws us toward our desires . . . .”  Katherine M. 
Franke, Theorizing Yes: An Essay on Feminism, Law, and Desire, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 181, 206–07 
(2001).  For more on the tension between feminism and queer theory as it applies to rape, see 
generally Katharine K. Baker & Michelle Oberman, Women’s Sexual Agency and the Law of Rape 
in the 21st Century, 69 STUD. IN L., POL. & SOC’Y 63 (2015), 
http://www.emeraldinsight.com/doi/pdfplus/10.1108/S1059-433720160000069003.  
 115.  See Baker & Oberman, supra note 114 at 25–31 (relating college women’s sexual 
experiences). 
 116.  During one two-week period, 50% of college women and 26% of college men in the study 
said they engaged in unwanted coitus.  See Bang-Cheng and Eliseo-Arras, supra note 105 at 386. 
 117.  See supra note 101.  
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may be comparably insulting, demeaning, and inconsistent with the 
norms of equality that Title IX requires educational institutions to foster.  
The need to restrict such conduct is rooted not so much in the gravity of 
the injury it inflicts on individual victims, but in the harm to the 
communal norms of respect, civility, and equality on college campuses. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Despite all of the publicity that DOE’s enforcement effort has 
received, few people are addressing the hard questions that need to be 
addressed pertaining to sexual misconduct on college campuses.  And 
courts are failing to understand the nature of the cases in front of them.  
DOE is not requiring universities to re-codify or enforce criminal law.  It 
is requiring schools to police harassing conduct.  Criminal safeguards 
need not apply, but questions about discrimination law remain. 
 Answering those questions requires thinking hard about whether it is 
appropriate for universities to penalize individuals, as the civil law does, 
without overwhelming proof that those individuals have done something 
wrong.  Discrimination law allows fact finders to choose sides in 
credibility contexts even though it would be perfectly reasonable to 
choose either side.  Is that an appropriate approach to sexual misconduct 
on college campuses?  That is a question that should be taking up more 
of our time. 
Comparably, more people need to be discussing whether there is 
something wrong with men’s sense of sexual entitlement.  One cannot 
assess the propriety of DOE’s policies without being willing to articulate 
standards for acceptable sexual behavior.  Many women do not like or 
appreciate or want to accept the way many men treat them sexually, but 
only a few women’s lives are being shattered by men’s sexual treatment 
of them.
118
  Many women just endure this treatment because they 
understand there is a norm of male sexual entitlement and they do not 
want to be seen as complainers.  Should the burden be on women to stop 
the male behavior that they find offensive, or should schools be allowed, 
                                                          
 118.  Some women are profoundly affected by men’s callous treatment.  In an incident reported 
in the Harvard Crimson, one victim recounted a story that almost certainly did not involve criminal 
rape, but  did severely impact her ability to pursue her education.  See Anonymous, Dear Harvard: 
You Win, THE HARVARD CRIMSON (Mar. 31, 2014), 
http://www.thecrimson.com/article/2014/3/31/Harvard-sexual-assault/.  All the victim was asking for 
was that Harvard force the accused to switch dorms.  Id.  Harvard did not.  Id.  One of the things that 
makes this issue so difficult is that it is not easy to tell how different women may be affected by the 
same kind of aggressive male sexual behavior.  Again, criminal and civil law tend to treat this issue 
differently.  In the civil context, at least with torts, a tortfeasor has to take his victim as he finds her.   
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perhaps even required under Title IX, to come to women’s aid? 
 
